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ARGUMENT
Mr. Cramer is constitutionally entitled to testify. He was not advised of this right and
precluded from testifying by trial counsel. This constituted both ineffective assistance of
counsel and violation of a fundamental constitutional right. New appellate counsel also failed
to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal. This also constituted ineffective
assistance. An award of a new trial is necessary to uphold Cramer's constitutional right to
testify and to be assisted by counsel.
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel is a Constitutional Challenge that May be
Brought in Collateral Proceedings Regardless of Whether or Not Petitioner Could
have Raised the Claim on Direct Appeal
Cramer's conviction can be overturned due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The State insists that Cramer should not be permitted to raise the constitutional issue of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a post-conviction petition because ineffective
assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal. (State's Br. at 1, 8, 13-15.) This
argument must be rejected. Utah courts should follow Massaro v. United States in which the
United States Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance may be brought in a collateral
proceeding under the federal scheme whether or not it could have been raised on direct appeal.
Additionally, just because ineffective assistance may be raised on direct appeal does not mean
that it must be raised or thereafter be procedurally barred from collateral attack.
A.

Utah Judicial Authority Over Post-Conviction Proceedings, and Massaro
v. United States, Holding that Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel May
be Brought in Post-Conviction Regardless of Whether it Could Have Been
Raised on Direct Appeal

1

Cramer is entitled to raise both ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in this post-conviction proceeding. The State's position that
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred "suffers from constitutional
infirmities." Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ^[17.94 P.3d 263. The authority relied upon by
the State is the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"). However, in Gardner v. Galetka,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the power to review post-conviction petitions
"quintessentially belongs to the judicial branch of government" pursuant to article VII of the
Utah Constitution. IdL (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court stated that "the
legislature may not impose restrictions which limit post-conviction relief as a judicial rule of
procedure, except as provided in the constitution." Id. As a result, the PCRA cannot limit
what may be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief, especially ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that have not been raised previously on direct appeal. See id.
The United States Supreme Court agrees that an accused should be able to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a post-conviction relief petition,
regardless of whether or not it could have been raised on direct appeal. In Massaro v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court "h[e]ld that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
may be brought in a collateral proceeding under [the federal scheme] whether or not the
petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500, 504 (2003). Massaro explains why it is preferable to have ineffective assistance raised
in post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal. The trial record is not developed
for the object of litigating ineffective assistance, and is therefore incomplete or inadequate.
2

Id. at 504-05. As a result, ineffective assistance claims are best "litigated in the first instance
in the district court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the
adequacy of the representation during an entire trial." Id at 505. In the end the Supreme Court
held "that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not
bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding [under the federal postconviction scheme]." Id. at 509.
Pursuant to Article VIII of the Utah Constitution, Utah courts should follow the United
States Supreme Court. This Court should likewise hold that ineffective assistance may be
brought in a collateral proceeding under the Utah scheme whether or not the petitioner could
have raised the claim on direct appeal. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504, 509. Post-conviction
relief is meant to challenge constitutional defects, and therefore it is imperative that issues of
constitutional importance not be barred from being raised in post-conviction collateral
proceedings regardless of whether or not they could have been pursued on direct appeal.
B.

Rule 23B is Permissive, and Failure to Opt for This Speedier Process Does
Not Result in a Procedural Bar

Moreover, just because a claim of ineffective assistance may be raised on direct appeal
does not mean that it must be raised or thereafter be procedurally barred from collateral attack.
Utah courts have explained that, contrary to the State's assertion, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are ordinarily addressed through collateral attack post-conviction petitions, not
on direct appeal. See State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,12 P.3d 92; State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d
484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Litherland. the Utah Supreme Court explained that

3

ineffective assistance may be raised on direct appeal if the record is complete and defendant
is represented by counsel other than trial counsel.1 Raising ineffective assistance on direct
appeal is the exception, however, and not the general rule. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487. This
exception is an option if there is new counsel on appeal, and if there is an adequate trial record
to raise the issue. Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487. Under these circumstances, raising the issue is
still permissive, not mandatory. Id.
The virtue of raising issues on direct appeal is that it "speed[s] resolution of some
ineffective-assistance claims." Id at 507. However, the fact that a claim may be raised on
direct appeal does not mean that it must be raised or be forever barred. As one solution, Rule
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits creation of a record. The rule provides
one mechanism for appellate counsel to create a record so that an issue normally raised in postconviction—ineffective assistance of counsel-can be raised in a direct appeal. Litherland at
TJ13. However, failure to opt for this speedier mechanism does not bar ineffective assistance
from being raised in post-conviction. If an accused in Utah wishes to pursue ineffective
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, he is permitted to do so. However, the fact that a
speedier option exists does not preclude an accused from choosing to wait and raise ineffective

1

In the instant case, new appellate counsel existed, but the record was not
complete because it was not developed for the object of litigating ineffective assistance.
Thus, appellate counsel could have opted to develop a record through Rule 23B. She did
not. Given the existence of new counsel on appeal and the mechanism of Rule 23B, it
should have been obvious that in order to raise ineffective assistance, either a Rule 23B
hearing was necessary; or the issue would have to wait for post-conviction attack.
4

assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.2 This is supported by Utah law, Massaro
v. United States, and common sense. Thus, Cramer's conviction can be overturned due to the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
C.

Assuming the State's Argument As True, that Failure by Appellate Counsel
to Raise Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Bars it from Being Raised
Collaterally, then Cramer is Entitled to a New Trial Due to Ineffective
Assistance of Appellate Counsel.

The State insists that Cramer's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
procedurally barred because appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.
(State's Br. at 13.) If the State's argument is adopted, then Cramer is entitled to a new trial due
to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. If ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
procedurally barred due to appellate counsel's failure to move for a Rule 23B hearing, this
results in the claim being forever lost and thus prejudices Cramer.
II.

Failure to Advise Cramer of His Constitutional Right to Testify Irrespective of
Advice Not to Testify Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel, and
Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise this Obvious Issue Constituted Ineffective
Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Cramer maintains that an accused is deprived of the constitutional right to testify where

trial counsel advises him not to testify as a matter of trial strategy, but fails to advise him that
the right to testify is a constitutional right and that irrespective of the strategic advice, the

2

If an accused decides to raise the ineffective assistance on direct appeal through
Rule 23B, but then seeks a second bite at the apple in a post-conviction proceeding, it
may be proper under those circumstances to procedurally bar the claim. However, in
cases like the instant one where ineffective assistance was not raised on direct appeal
through Rule 23B, the claim should not be barred simply because Rule 23B existed as an
option to create a record that would then have permitted the issue to be raised.
5

decision whether or not to testify belongs to the accused alone.
Cramer was not so advised. He was told he was not to testify as a matter of trial
strategy. He was never advised that regardless of this advice, the decision of whether or not
to testify at trial was a constitutional right that belonged to him alone.
A.

The State's Claim that Appellate Counsel was Not Ineffective Because the
Trial Record Did Not Contain Attorney-Client Communications that
Would Have Triggered Ineffective Assistance Lacks Merit

The State contends that appellate counsel was not ineffective because "[njothing in the
appellate record would have made it obvious to appellate counsel that Cramer wished to take
the stand." (State's Br. at 19.) Instead of directly addressing whether or not Cramer was
advised of his constitutional right to testify, the State claims Cramer cannot demonstrate
prejudice because "Cramer has never identified what information appellate counsel had that
would have alerted them to any appellate claim grounded in his failure to testify." (State's Br.
at 19.) This attempt to avoid the issue must be rejected; a trial record would not contain such
information for appellate counsel, nor should it. A review of the trial record would never
contain information that would trigger an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As explained
in Massaro v. United States, the trial record is not developed for the object of litigating
ineffective assistance claims and is therefore often incomplete. Id. at 504-05. A trial record
would obviously not contain attorney-client communications that are necessary for determining
whether or not an accused is advised of his constitutional right to testify.
Moreover, the State's argument that the trial record does not contain facts that would
trigger ineffective assistance of trial counsel actually supports Cramer's position. Either
6

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to create a record pursuant to Rule 23B, resulting
in no record to address ineffective assistance on direct appeal, barring the issue and thereby
prejudicing Cramer; or the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not procedurally
barred and must be heard in this post-conviction proceeding because it is through such a postconviction proceeding that a record may be created to elicit the necessary facts-specifically
attorney client communications that are not in the trial record.
Irrespective of the trial record, ineffective assistance of trial counsel should still have
been obvious to appellate counsel given the context and circumstances surrounding Cramer's
case. The State focuses on the trial record, claiming that counsel must show that an issue
which was not raised was "obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have
resulted in reversal on appeal." See Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1995); Carter
v. Galetka. 2001 UT 96, ^}48,44 P.2d 626.3 Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should
not, however, necessarily be limited only to issues apparent in the trial record. The instant case
is a prime example. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel should have been obvious to
appellate counsel given the context and circumstances surrounding the initial appeal. Under
Utah law ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised where the defendant is represented by
new counsel on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027.1029 (Utah 1991V New

3

Cramer also maintains that Banks and Carter articulate a standard higher than the
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 466
U.S. 668 (1984) and that to the extent that this standard articulated in Banks and adopted
by Carter deviates from the Strickland standard, this Court should follow the Strickland
precedent.
7

appellate counsel was assigned in the instant case. Rule 23B states that "[a] party to an appeal
in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings
of fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance."
Utah R. App. P. 23B (2006). A cursory review of the rules would have raised this procedural
mechanism. Moreover, criminal cases are not limited to the record; and brief communication
with Cramer would have brought this issue of ineffective assistance to the forefront.
Irrespective of the record, given the fact that new counsel was appointed on appeal,
Rule 23B, the fact that the instant case was a criminal case in which the accused did not testify,
it should have been obvious to appellate counsel to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
B.

Thoroughly Advising and Instructing An Accused Not to Testify as a
Matter of Trial Strategy is Insufficient to Advise an Accused of His
Constitutional Right to Testify Irrespective of Advice by Counsel

The State further argues that Cramer cannot prove that he was denied the right to testify
because "[t]he post-conviction court found that trial counsel 'thoroughly covered' the issue of
Cramer testifying at trial." (State's Br. at 23.) However, "thoroughly covering]" the issue as
a matter of trial strategy is not the same as advising an accused that he has a constitutional right
to testify, that the decision whether or not to testify belongs to the accused alone, and that the
accused may still decide to testify irrespective of counsel's advice.
1.

The Evidence that Cramer was Not Properly Advised

The evidence elicited in the post-conviction hearing demonstrates that Cramer was not
properly advised of his constitutional right to testify. At the evidentiary hearing, Cramer and

8

his trial counsel, Kim Clark and John O'Connell testified. The evidence reveals that Cramer
was told he was not to testify as a matter of trial strategy, but he was never advised that
regardless of this advice and strategy, the decision of whether or not to testify at trial was a
constitutional right that belonged to him alone. The entire evidence relating to this issue was
outlined in Cramer's opening brief. Cramer outlines it again herein.4
Cramer's trial counsel met with him twice, once before his preliminary hearing, and
once before trial. (R. 547 at 8:16-22.) It was during these two meetings that Cramer's
testimony was discussed. (R. 547 at 8:16 to 9:6 & 9:15 to 11:5.) Because trial counsel was

4

The State claims that Cramer has not marshaled the evidence that pertains to
Cramer not being advised of his constitutional right to testify. (State's Br. at 23-24.)
This proposed standard is incorrect. First, the cases cited by the State, Wilson Supply,
Inc. v. Fradan Manuf. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177, and Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT
82, 100 P.3d 1177, are not even criminal cases, much less post-conviction cases. (See
State's Br. at 23.) Rather, they are civil cases that discuss the marshaling requirement in
wholly unrelated circumstances. See Wilson Supply. Inc.. 2002 UT 94 atffl[21-30, 54
P.3d 1177 (applying marshaling requirement to challenge against finding of fact that one
party marketed another's product in civil case involving whether business relationship
constituted manufacturer-dealer relationship under buy-back statute); Chen. 2004 UT 82
at ^ 73-84 (applying marshaling requirement to challenge against preliminary injunction
barring corporate defendants from competing with another corporate party in civil case
involving alleged corporate waste, breach of fiduciary duty, and improper removal of a
corporate director). Second, there is no authority indicating that an accused must marshal
evidence in a post-conviction proceeding. Rather, applicable authority indicates that in
post-conviction proceedings an accused must satisfy the Strickland standard. See, e.g..
State v. Carter. 2001 UT 96, f 31, 44 P.3d 626. Any standard beyond Strickland would
be constitutionally infirm. Third, even if a marshaling standard applied, Cramer has
presented in his opening brief and again in this reply brief, all of the evidence that
pertains to this issue of never being properly informed of his constitutional right to testify.
The testimony at the post-conviction proceeding shows that Cramer was told not to testify
as a matter of trial strategy, but he was never informed of his constitutional right to testify
irrespective of counsel's advice and that the decision to testify was his alone.
9

concerned about prior convictions, Cramer "was told [he] was not going to testify." (R. 547
at 9:5-6.) Cramer testified that neither "Ms. Clark or Mr. O'Connell explained to [him] that
he had the right to testify even if they were advising against it." (R. 547 at 11:2-5.) At the
preliminary hearing, Cramer's counsel placed on the record that she informed Cramer of the
right to testify and present witnesses, but that she advised him not to. (R. 547 at 9; 33:18-24.)
This was at the preliminary hearing, however, and not done at trial. (R. 547 at 33:25 to 34:3.)
The second meeting was prior to trial. (R. 547 at 9:15-21.) Cramer testified that trial
counsel never advised Cramer that he still had a Constitutional right to testify even though they
were advising against it. (R.547 at 11:2-5.) Cramer and counsel discussed witnesses, (R. 547
at 9:22-24), but trial counsel indicated that they were not going to call any character witnesses
on his behalf. (R. 547 at 10:5-9.) Cramer testified that trial counsel was "adamant" that he
was not to testify. (R. 547 at 10:21-25.) According to Cramer, trial counsel told him she
would "step on [his] neck" if he did testify, and told him that they would not discuss the issue
again. (R. 547 at 10:23-25.) Trial counsel testified that she did not recall these threats, (R.
68:18-24), and the trial court found Cramer's claim of this threat to be not credible.
Regardless of the credibility on this threat, it was made clear in the State's crossexamination of Cramer that Cramer tried to tell trial counsel that he wanted to testify. (R. 547
at 34:23-25.) Cramer discussed how he was advised of a right to testify at the preliminary
hearing when counsel placed it on the record. (R. 547 at 33:17 to 34:3.) Cramer understood
that his prior convictions would be introduced if he testified at trial. (R. 547 at 34:12-22.) He

10

still tried to bring up that he wanted to testify at trial, but counsel insisted that she would not
discuss the issue with him again, and that he was not going to testify. (R. 547 at 35:1-9.)
Kim Clark and John O'Connell never contradict the evidence that Cramer was never
advised of his constitutional right to testify irrespective of the strategic advice. In the context
of discussing the issue of Mr. Cramer testifying at trial, Kim Clark admitted that Cramer was
"persistent."5 (R. 547 at 56:14-18.) Notwithstanding Cramer's persistence, Ms. Clark testified
that she still did not advise Cramer of his constitutional right to testify despite her advice. (R.
547 at 56:14-18.) Ms. Clark concluded that Cramer should not testify as a matter of strategy
because of her perceived risk of prior convictions. (R. 547 at 54:13 to 55:13.) Her decision
not to let Cramer testify was a strategic one, based on her experience as a trial lawyer, (R. 547
at 55:14-17), and experience as a juror, (R. 547 at 55:18 to 56:1). It was her decision, not
Cramer's. On direct examination Ms. Clark was directly asked whether she had a "specific
recollection of discussing with [Cramer] that he had a right to testify on his own behalf despite

5

The State suggests that this testimony should be interpreted without the context of
the evidentiary hearing-the State argues that Cramer was persistent as a general
personality trait. The testimony speaks for itself. After testifying about the issue of
Cramer testifying (testimony that continues for three pages of transcript), Kim Clark
clarified her testimony that she advised him not to testify because she believed a prior
conviction would have been introduced into evidence. (R. 547 at 54:13 to 56:18.) Kim
Clark then testified that Cramer was persistent. (Id.) After so testifying, Ms. Clark
continued to discuss the reasons why she instructed Cramer not to testify at trial. (R. 547
at 56:16 to 57:15.) Kim Clark never qualified her testimony to state that Mr. Cramer was
only persistent as a general trait and not persistent when it came to the issue of him
testifying. Instead, Cramer's persistence was discussed in the context of him testifying at
trial, and trial counsel's advice that he not testify.
11

[her] advising him not to." (R. 547 at 57:11-14.) Instead of testifying that she advised Cramer
that he had a right to testify despite her strategic advice that he not testify, she stated, "I don't
believe I put it in those terms, no." (R. 547 at 57:11-15.)
On cross examination, Ms. Clark reiterated that she advised Cramer that he not testify
as a matter of trial strategy because, she believed, his prior conviction would be introduced.
(R. 547 at 67:18 to 68:15.) She then testified that Cramer never told her, over her advice and
insistence that he not testify, that he wanted to testify. (R. 547 at 68:16 to 69:15.)
John O'Connell testified that he had no specific recollection of any conversation with
Cramer about Cramer testifying at trial. (R. 547 at 96:24 to 97:4.) On cross examination, Mr.
O'Connell testified regarding pre-trial investigation, his role as cross examiner of M.L. and
giving the opening statement, and trial strategy. (R. 547 at 97:11 to 101:13.) He also reiterated
that he did not remember discussing Cramer wanting to testify at trial with Cramer. (R. 547
at 101:7-13.)
In sum, the record evidence from the post-conviction hearing demonstrates that Cramer
was not properly advised of his constitutional right to testify. Cramer was told he was not to
testify as a matter of trial strategy. He was never advised that regardless of this advice and
strategy, the decision of whether or not to testify at trial was a constitutional right that belonged
to him alone. He was never told he had a constitutional right to testify regardless of the advice
that he not testify as a matter of trial strategy. The testimony from Kim Clark and John
O'Connell never contradicts this. As a result, Cramer is entitled to a new trial.

12

2.

Legal Authority that Cramer was Not Properly Advised

The State also contends that Cramer has not cited to any controlling Utah authority for
the proposition that required trial counsel to advise Cramer that he had a constitutional right
to disregard strategic advice and testify anyway. (State's Br. at 24-25.) However, Cramer
points out that the constitutional right to testify is more explicit in the Utah Constitution than
it is in the United States Constitution which contains no equivalent. Utah Const, art. I., § 12
("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r i g h t . . . to testify in his own behalf..
. . " ) . Cramer also identifies other jurisdictions that have explained that an accused must not
only be informed of his constitutional right to testify, but the accused must be aware that the
decision is his to make, irrespective of his counsel's advice on whether or not to testify. See
Wogan v. United States. 846 F. Supp. 135, 140 (D. Me. 1994) ("While Counsel in [the] case
advances a strategic reason for advising Petitioner not to testify, he also had a 'primary
responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify or not to testify, the strategic
implications of each choice, and that it is ultimately for the defendant himself to decide."');
United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11 th Cir. 1992). The State's rebuttal to this
authority is that it is "non-controlling." However, it is the constitutional duty of the courts to
decide what the law is, and, where the law has not yet been clearly articulated, to do so.
Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 66,f 13,7 P.3d 777. Further, when appellate courts state
what the law is, the law applies both prospectively and retrospectively. See State v. LovelL
2005 UT 31,1J24, 114 P.3d 575. Thus, just because the issue has not been framed to Utah
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courts and therefore no decision has expressly stated the law does not mean it is not the law.
Cramer maintains that an accused has a constitutional right to be advised that, regardless
of advice not to testify as a matter of trial strategy, the decision of whether or not to testify at
trial is a constitutional right that belongs to him alone, and that the accused has the right to
testify regardless of the strategic advice that he not testify, then this Court should expressly
state that this is the law. It was ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to so advise
Cramer, and, for the reasons outlined above, it was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel.6
C.

Prejudice to Cramer

The State claims that Cramer cannot establish that appellate counsel's failures resulted

6

The State would require an accused to insist on the right to testify over strategic
advice. (See State's Br. at 24.) According to the State, Cramer should have listened to
trial counsel tell him not to testify, never been told that he had a constitutional right to
testify despite their advice, and then insist over counsel's advice that he wanted to testify.
This is inconsistent with constitutional safeguards and Utah law that defense counsel is
responsible to safeguard the accused's constitutional right to testify. Utah has imposed
this safeguard on defense counsel by not requiring the trial court to engage in an on-therecord colloquy with the accused. See, e.g.. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). For this purported safeguard of defense counsel to be of any value, it is
insufficient to simply discuss, as a matter of strategy, whether or not to testify-even if this
issue is "throughly discussed." In any criminal proceeding, because the State always
bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the question of whether or
not the accused should testify will always be an issue. Thus, defense counsel will always
discuss with the accused the pros and cons of testifying. However, no matter how
thorough the discussion of the benefits and risks of testifying, this is not sufficient to
safeguard a constitutional right. An accused has a right to be informed specifically that,
irrespective of the risks and benefits of testifying that may have been thoroughly
discussed, he or she has a constitutional right to testify irrespective of the advice received,
and that the decision whether or not to testify belongs to the accused alone.
14

in prejudice. For the reasons discussed in Section I, ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
not procedurally barred, and trial counsel's errors prejudiced Cramer.
Because Cramer was not properly advised of his constitutional right to testify and
precluded from testifying, he was prejudiced because the verdict turned on the credibility of
one witness, and the absence of testimony from Cramer results in a lack of confidence in the
outcome. In cases where a verdict is only weakly supported by the record, the verdict is more
likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.
Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620,633 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.)
Cramer's case turned on the credibility of one witness, M.L. State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, f7,
44 P.3d 690 (noting that "the case depended on M.L.'s credibility"). Because M.L.'s story
was inconsistent (he initially denied being abused), Cramer's testimony was vital. Cramer
needed only to establish reasonable doubt, and there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been different if Cramer had been permitted to testify. This is because there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the jury would have found M.L.'s testimony less credible had
Cramer been permitted to deny M.L.'s assertions.7

7

The State claims that Cramer would not deny abusing M.L. (State's Br. at 2728.) The State cannot legitimately claim that Cramer would not deny the abuse at trial.
When asked in interrogatories (served by the State in this proceeding) what he would
have testified to at trial, Cramer stated, inter alia, that he would have rebutted M.L.'s
story. (R. 447-48.) Moreover, the entire reason Cramer has sought a new trial through
post-conviction relief is because he maintains his innocence and maintains that he never
abused M.L. Cramer has repeatedly reiterated to all involved in this matter, including
through letters he has sent directly to the Attorney General's Office, that he is innocent
and did not abuse M.L. Further, while not in the appellate record, Cramer is not eligible
15

The state claims that Cramer has not met a burden of showing that "his testimony would
have made a more favorable outcome reasonably likely." (State's Br. at 27.) However, "in
evaluating a claim of prejudice, the question is not whether counsel's deficient performance
more likely than not made a difference in the outcome; rather it is whether there is a
'reasonable probability' that the result would have been different, meaning 'a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" White v. Godinez. 301 F.3d 796,804 (7th
Cir. 2002). As explained previously, given the tenuous nature of the State's evidence from
M.L., the absence of testimony from Cramer undermines confidence in the outcome.
III.

Trial Counsel Overbore Cramer's Will
Where there is evidence that counsel's advice not to testify overcame the client's desire

to testify, an accused's constitutional right to testify is denied, and trial counsel is ineffective.
See, e.g., Tyler v. State. 793 So.2d 137,141-42 (Fla.Ct.App. 2001). Trial counsel's insistence
that Cramer not testify overbore Cramer's will. This constitutes ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

for therapy or parol at the Utah State Prison where he is currently incarcerated because he
refuses to admit guilt and continues to maintain his innocence-that he never abused M.L.
Moreover, instead of addressing the issue head-on at the evidentiary hearing, the State
sidestepped it and now attempts to use this sidestepping as a sword. At the evidentiary
hearing the State never asked Cramer if he would have denied abusing M.L. Instead of
asking the question, the State hid in the grass and then argued in closing argument that
Cramer's lack of a statement such as "I would have testified that I did not abuse M.L." on
direct examination necessarily means that Cramer would not deny abusing M.L. at trial.
(See R. 547 at 116:14-22.) Cramer can be asked to admit or deny the abuse of M.L. at his
new trial.
16

in any way, including this point, also constitutes ineffective assistance.
1 he State attempts !o »ivoid llu* r.Mirln jiii'iun^ Ih'iM i HUM « i h n l i l n ^ nmiiiu'iii m

the post conviction hearing before the district court. (State's Mem. at 26.) The record does
not support any such waiver. During the hearing, counsel clarified that he was advocating for
an on-the record colloquy, and that he was arguing that Ci ai nei ": ' vv as ne v ei ad\ ised b) coi msel
that he had a i ight t : testif) and hence there was no knowing waiver of that constitutional
right." (R. 547 at 120.) There is no u ai\ ei of the ai uunu n\ thai Cramer^ % ill was overborne.
The State also claim- huii i ia.nv-. ^ ,MJ; was not uvL:i>orne and ^ :ses Ci amei of
misstating ti ial c
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record testimony

speaks for itself and supports Cramer's position that his will was overborne. The details of the
discussions of Cramer testifying are detailed in Section II above. Trial counsel was adamant
that Cramer not testif)

I his decision was i lot i xi : pe i I, t o v • aj disci issioii after w hich

Ci amei made the decision. The decision was made by counsel, not Cramer. Trial counsel
admitted that she told Cramer not to testify, and that she, not Cramer, reached this decision
based on her experience as a ti ial lawyer and formei jui oi , (R 54 7 at 55:1 1- to 5' 7:15 )
Preji idice is also satisfied for the same reasons pven previously. Given M.L.'s shaky
testimony, there is a reasonable basis that the jury would nave found M.L.'s testimony less
credible had Cramer been permitted to testily Cramer needed c til) to ci eate reasonable doi lbt.
1 'hi is, tl iere is a i easonablepi obability 1:1 lat Cramei 's testii i 101 ir; would have altered the jury's
finding, and the absence of his testimony undermines confidence in the outcome.

i;

IV.

On the Record Colloquy to Safeguard Explicit Utah Constitutional Right
The State argues that Cramer cannot be awarded a new trial because, given State v.

Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), it was not obvious to appellate counsel to have
argued for an on-the-record colloquy. (State's Br. at 20-22.) Cramer acknowledges that
Brooks holds that a trial court does not have an obligation to conduct a sua sponte colloquy
with an accused to address the accused's constitutional right to testify. Id. at 365. However,
reading Brooks would have alerted counsel that this Court did not address the Utah
Constitution's explicit grant of the right to testify. The court stated that it "[did] not . . .
provide a separate analysis" under the Utah Constitution. Id. at n.2. 8 Given the explicit right

8

The State claims that the Brooks court "did not ignore the issue of a state
constitutional analysis" and somehow addressed Utah Const, art. I., § 12. (State's Br. at
20, n.2.) Cramer maintains that while the accused in Brooks may not have presented
sufficient reasoning to merit an analysis, this provision of the Utah Constitution has never
been interpreted by Utah's appellate courts, and that this case presents the opportunity.
Footnote 2 of Brooks states, in part: "defendant advances arguments under both the state
and federal constitutions, and cites State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) [,] as
authority for separate construction of the Utah Constitution. Defendant, however, offers
no persuasive reason for varying from the majority position under the federal
counterparts. We do not, therefore, provide a separate analysis." Thus, it is clear that no
state constitutional analysis was undertaken in Brooks. Indeed, there is no Utah state
constitutional analysis of the impact of Article I, Section 12 anywhere in the Brooks
opinion. The instant case presents the opportunity to address this Utah Constitutional
provision as the issue has been briefed by Cramer. Cramer has pointed out the
differences between the Utah and United States Constitutions in his opening brief, and
maintains that the express grant in the Utah Constitution that does not exist in the federal
constitution merits greater safeguards in Utah for ensuring the constitutional right to
testify. Case law from other jurisdictions has also been provided in support, including
case law from jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions that require an on the
record colloquy. (See Cramer's Opening Br. at 35-38.).
18
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unbined with brooks' tacit invitation to address the issue in footnote

2, and the fact that other states have ruled that trial courts must conduct an on-the-record
colloquy to safeguard the constitutional nght ..
IIHOM

mil jniil 111 ti -nl if ii Li I ji|[!||H Haft' rounsrl should have argued that Utah should require the

same. This case presents an ideal opportunity to decide an open question that involves
interpretation of the Utah Constitution,1''
V.

• Trial Counsel and the ^•^tricl Court's F allure to Preserve the UNI Records
Reviewed In Camera Under Seal Precluded Appellate Review, and Appellate
Counsel's Failure to Supplement the Record When Instructed to do so By the Utah
Supreme Court
Cramer's trial and appellate counsel were ineffecti v e foi failing to i i lake tl it 2 I ) I II
/( j t 0 C0|11 p e j

disclosure of M.L.'s U NI

records, and the district court conducted an in camera review and determined that none of the
records was material. However, nothing was done to ensure that the documents ... * A r i •--y

' llic State also aticiiipts to avoid this issue by claiming that it was not preserved.
(See State's Br. at 22.) Cramer clearly raised this issue in the post-conviction trial court,
and therefore preserved the issue. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel identified relevant
authority, (R. 547 at 108:21 to 110:24, pointing to Colorado and Hawaii cases in which
those courts required an on-the-record colloquy, and to Article I, Section 12), and then
discussed with the trial court the "colloquy approach," and stated "if this case goes up on
appeal, I will certainly advocate that that be adopted [in Utah]." (R. 547 at 119:13 to
120:3.) The State cannot legitimately claim that this issue was not preserved; this issue
was clearly raised to a level of consciousness m the irul eourt.
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the district court remained part of the record, albeit necessarily under seal. On appeal,
appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred in conducting an in camera review rather than
allowing direct access to the records. Cramer, 2002 UT 9 at ^[17, 44 P.3d 690. The Utah
Supreme Court pointed out that the UNI records were not part of the record, and without fully
considering Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11, admonished counsel to supplement the
record. Appellate counsel did not supplement the record. Moreover, appellate counsel never
advised the court, either orally or in writing, that the record could not be supplemented.10
Appellate counsel did nothing. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court "presume[d] that the trial
court correctly determined that none of the records was material to Cramer's defense."
Cramer, 2002 UT 9 at f 28, 44 P.3d 690 (citation omitted.)
These failures by trial and appellate counsel constitute deficient performance. Trial
counsel should have requested that the UNI records be kept under seal in the record. Appellate
counsel should have responded to the Utah Supreme Court's admonition.11
The State contends that Cramer cannot prove ineffective assistance because the current
post-conviction record also does not include the UNI records. (State's Br. at 30-32.) The

10

The UNI records could not have been supplemented under Rule 11 because the
UNI records were not preserved under seal in the trial record by trial counsel. See Utah
R. App. P. 11(h) (2006); State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, ^[2, 75 P.3d 923 (supplementing
the record is "appropriate only when the record must be augmented because of an
omission or exclusion,. . . not to introduce new material into the record).
11

The State even concedes "that failing to supplement the record amounted to
constitutionally deficient representation." (State's Br. at 30 & 41 n.18.)
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problem with the State's position is that because the records reviewed by the district court were
not preserved in the record under seal, there is i IC • < < aj ofi nakingtl losere 1:01 dspai t of thepc st
1
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• the district court did not keep the UMI records under seal,

there is no way to ensure that the records produced in camera years ago would be the same
records UNI has on M.I,. now
•; •••

Preji idice exists becai lse faih n e • IT; 1:1 i : disti ic t cc 1 n I: ai i i ti ial counsel to preserve the

UNI records in the trial record precluded Cramer from any type of appellate review regarding
the records. The State cannot legitimately blame Cramer for failing to show what exculpatory
I
information i; .i1 il.i- ' M
JI tu niik

u

lr i lln in unIs were never keptundei seal and there is no

way of ensuring any recreation of the records. In short, because the circumstances surrounding
the UNI records preclude any type of appellate review, Cramer is prejudiced.
VI.

Failure to Investigate or Introduce i ) 0 C u m e i | t s j n Cramet
Counsel and Failure to Raise this Issue by Appellate Counsel
The State claims that Cramer cannot establish ineffective assistance because Cramer

cannot "prove that [appellate] counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from the record
or that probably w i.ul il ,lu\ < stii"iealul, iSiniv <; l\v .:il l} A; l \ )
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forth in Section I, Cramer is entitled to raise both ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
appellate counsel in this post-conviction proceeding.
A.

Strategic Decisions Cannot Be Mad ell Jntil \ fl ei an Adequate In i estigation

1 'he Site ite doe s i i :)t dispi ite that the right to effective assistance imposes upon a criminal
defense attorney the duty to conduct an adequate investigation. Powell v, Alabama, 2871 J.S.
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45, 58 (1932). Instead, the State claims a strategic decision: trial counsel "made a strategic
decision not to use [the CASA documents]"(State's Br. at 39); trial counsel made a purported
strategic decision not to use the CPS records—even though she had not seen them, (State's Br.
at 33, 40); and trial counsel made a strategic decision not to call witnesses because, based on
summaries of information from an investigator, she "believed that the character witness
testimony would have opened the door to admitting prior guilty pleas." (State's Br. at 34.)
The State admits that trial counsel did not review the CPS records, stating, "trial counsel
testified that the CPS format did not look like a format that she had seen before

" (State's

Br. at 33.) This failure to investigate constitutes ineffective assistance. Strategic decisions can
only be made after an adequate investigation or reasonable decision that an investigation is
unnecessary. Strickland 466 U.S. at 690-91; State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182.188 (Utah 1991).
The State takes issue with Cramer's insistence that a "complete" investigation is
necessary. (State's Br. at 35.) Certainly the State would have to agree that an "incomplete"
investigation would constitute deficient performance. Moreover, the above authority speaks
for itself. Trial counsel could not purport to make a strategic decision without first
investigating by at least reviewing the material identified by Cramer.
Indeed, Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005), holds that an incomplete
investigation can constitute ineffective assistance. The State attempts to discredit Rompilla
in a footnote, alleging that Cramer "misstates the holding to the extent that he suggests that
counsel, in general, may not rely on information provided by their client and the client's
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family." (State' s Br. at 3 6 n. 14.) Cramer makes no such suggesm i» ...... • i i w. the cases cited
by Cramer and criticized I: ) tl le Stat s, tl i1 :: holdii ig c f Roi i; ipilla speaks foi itself.
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govei nn lent in Rompilla, like the State in the instant case, "argue[d] that the information trial
counsel gathered from [the accused] and the other sources gave them sound reason to think ic
would have been pointless to spend time and money oi I tl le additic
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2463 Ii 11 esponse, the Coi n: t stated, "at id we can say that there is room for debate about trial
counsel's obligation to follow at least some of those potential lines of inquiry," and went on
to order a new Hal !d, at 246^. ?46l>
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i

HMMU

tnr

i • < > i ds instead of assuming

she was already familial vvuii tlicir contents.
An adequate investigation was especially necessary because Cramer provided to counsel
the names of individuals and identified iloniiti, ills This; IM kv.auui* "''an aftornrv ads as an
assisfa I

md not as a master." State v. Wood 648 P.2d 7 u 91 (Utah 1982). The

State never rebuts Cramer's point that the role of a law ver \s •« - act as an assistant and not as
the master.

12

The State's criticism that Rompilla "commented in passing that there was 'room
for debate'" (State's Br. at 36), is best rebutted by simply noting the following: This
language was used to rebut the government's claim that the investigation was sufficient.
After noting that the investigation was insufficient because its sufficiency was debatable,
the Court states, "There is no need to say more, however, for a further point is clear and
dispositive: the lawyers were deficient in failing to examine the court file on Rompilla's
prior conviction." Cramer submits that this language belies the State's statement that it
was made "in passing."
23

B.

Prejudice

Cramer was prejudiced. While the State argues that Cramer cannot prove prejudice,
(State's Br. at 37-40), Cramer reiterates that in cases like the instant case where the verdict
supported is by one shaky witness, the verdict is more likely to have been affected by errors
than one with overwhelming record support. See, e.g., Washington, 219 F.3d at 633. Indeed,
the Utah case of State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), explains that an appellate court
must "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as... how strongly
the verdict is supported by the record." 805 P.2d at 187.
The State attempts to discredit Templin by distinguishing it as a rape case, pointing out
factual differences, and claiming that "consent was not an issue in Cramer's prosecution."
(State's Br. at 38-39.) These factual differences do not make Templin inapplicable. To the
contrary, the court's directive remains—in cases like the instant case, the court must "consider
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as . . . how strongly the verdict is
supported by the record." 805 P.2d at 187. In the instant case, the verdict rests on the wavering
testimony of a minor child who initially denied being abused, a conviction not strongly
supported by the record. The same was true in Templin where "the state's case rested upon
the testimony of one person." Id. at 188. The Templin court awarded a new trial because u[a]n
appellate court cannot discern the exact effect such testimony would have had on the jury's
judgment concerning the credibility of [the victim and the accused]," and because "the
testimony . . . is of sufficient import that . . . there is a reasonable probability that if these
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witnesses had [testified], the outcome of the trial would have been dii icu nt.

*v. i «Ee same

result should be reached in the instant case.
VII

Cillmulative Error
Regarding the cumulative error doctrine, the parlies simply disagree on the above

issues: Cramer claims delicieiit pcrlormance and prejiiu^
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. • vn .

sedinii ,ihouL, *ii11i Ihr Slid' disagrees ( y lull admitting deficient performance for appellate
counsel's failure to supplement the record).
Cramer maintains that each of the ioregomg points, standing alone, constitutes giuimJ >
for a new
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. .;, <.. individually, Cramer

maintains that they are harmful cumulatively because the) undenr.im confidence in the
outcome. All Cramer needed to do was establish a reasonable doubt, and in such a case where
the State s onl>
('^•",-
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ppellate counsel' s failure to raise ineffective assistance on direct appeal

undermines confidence in the outcome of Cramer's case,
CONCLUSION
1 in t in ml i i tin it\ r ;)v^.;f(iotv nf counsel described herein, Cramer asks that he be
awarded a new trial at which he is provided effective assistance of counsel and permitted to
testify.
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